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Abstract
This paper presents estimates of the employment and welfare effects
of personal labour income taxation in Estonia. The labour supply deci-
sion of individuals is estimated based on data from the 2005 Estonian
Labour Force Survey. Economic incentives are found to affect the par-
ticipation decisions of individuals, but not the number of hours worked
by individuals already working. The participation elasticities are higher
for individuals in the middle income groups than for individuals in the
low and high income groups. Increasing the proportional tax rate by 1
percentage point is found to reduce total employment by 0.35 percent-
age points. The baseline estimate of the marginal cost of public funds
is 1.6 if the proportional tax rate is increased and 1.8 if the basic ex-
emption is lowered. The marginal cost of public funds varies across
different income groups, which may suggest possible gains in efﬁciency
from reallocating the taxation burden of the existing system of propor-
tional taxation. The employment and welfare estimates are subject to
substantial uncertainty.
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errors and omissions.Non-technical summary
This paper provides proximate estimates of the employment and welfare
effects of personal labour income taxation in Estonia. Personal labour in-
come taxes, along with social security taxes and taxes on consumption, create
a wedge between the costs of employing labour and the purchasing power at-
tained by providing labour. This distortion of the relative price of labour gen-
erally affects the decision of individuals regarding employment and induces a
loss in welfare.
The estimation of the employment and welfare effects of taxation is partic-
ularly important in the case of Estonia as the country has a “ﬂat tax” system
with proportional taxation of all personal income in excess of a basic exemp-
tion. Estonia was the ﬁrst European country to introduce a ﬂat tax in 1994
and a large number of central and east European countries have since adopted
similar systems.
The econometric analysis is based on the 2005 Estonian Labour Force
Survey comprising approximately 16,500 individuals of working age, among
which 8,000 are active in the labour market. The results suggest that the
hourly after-tax wage primarily affects the decision regarding participation,
while having a negligible effect on the number of working hours of individu-
als already working. Individuals in the middle income groups exhibit higher
labour participation elasticities than individuals in the low and high income
groups.
The participation elasticities — together with data on participation rates,
incomes and tax rates for each of the four income groups — is used to esti-
mate the employment effect of different tax policies. For instance, lowering
the basic exemption by 10 percent reduces total employment of working-age
individuals by slightly less than 0.5 percent. Increasing the proportional tax
rate by 1 percentage point reduces overall employment by 0.35 percent. Dif-
fering participation elasticities and mean incomes across the income groups
imply that the effect differs across the groups. The low and middle income
groups experience the largest employment reduction when the basic exemp-
tion is increased.
The excess burden of an incremental increase in tax revenue stems from re-
duced labour participation with a derived effect on tax revenue. The baseline
simulations suggest that if the proportional tax rate is increased, the marginal
cost of public funds is around 1.6, i.e. the extra cost of raising revenue is
approximately 60 percent in excess of the tax revenue generated. If the ba-
sic exemption is lowered, the marginal cost of public funds is estimated to
be around 1.8. The estimates of the marginal cost of public funds vary no-
2ticeably, dependent on the assumptions concerning pension contributions and
value added taxes.
The marginal cost of raising public funds through personal labour income
taxation differs markedly across different income groups. For instance, in the
baselinescenariothemarginalcostofpublicfundsisestimatedtobe4.7forthe
low income group, 4.3 for the middle-low income group, 2.3 for the middle-
high income group, and 1.3 for the high income group. These results may
point to possible efﬁciency gains from redistributing the tax burden as com-
pared totheexisting proportional tax system. On themargin, areduction ofthe
tax burden of lower income individuals will bring about a substantial labour
participation response and increase welfare. On the margin, an increase of the
tax burden of higher income individuals may only lead to a modest reduction
in employment and welfare for individuals in this group. Assuming a utilitar-
ian social welfare function, a revenue-neutral tax reform reducing the income
tax burden on lower income individuals and increasing it on higher income in-
dividuals may lead to higher societal welfare. This result is based on a narrow
assessment of the welfare consequences and overlooks, for example, admin-
istration costs, compliance issues and political economy issues. Furthermore,
the estimates of the employment and welfare effects are subject to substantial
uncertainty.
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4“The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the
largestamountoffeatherswiththeleastpossibleamountofhissing”,
Jean-Baptiste Colbert, 1619–1683, Minister of Finance for 22 years
under Louis XIV.1
1. Introduction
Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s dictum on optimal taxation has many interpreta-
tions. A modern reading would be that tax revenue should be raised so as
to minimise the costs borne by the taxpayers. Such costs consist of the ex-
cess burden resulting from taxes distorting price signals in the economy, but
possibly also employment costs if these are of separate interest.
This paper provides proximate estimates of the employment and welfare
effects of personal labour income taxation in Estonia. Personal labour in-
come taxes, along with social security taxes and taxes on consumption, create
a wedge between the costs of employing labour and the purchasing power
attained by providing labour. This distortion of the relative price of labour
generally affects the labour supply and induces a loss in welfare (Auerbach
and Hines, 2002).
The estimation of the employment and welfare effects of taxation is partic-
ularly important in the case of Estonia as the country has a “ﬂat tax” system
with proportional taxation of all personal income in excess of a basic exemp-
tion. Estonia was the ﬁrst European country to introduce a ﬂat tax in 1994
and a large number of central and east European countries have since adopted
similar systems (Keen et al., 2006).
The academic literature dealing speciﬁcally with ﬂat taxes is rather limited.
Keen et al. (2006) provide an overview of a number of theoretical and admin-
istrative issues concerning ﬂat taxes, while Saavedra et al. (2007) mainly focus
on the revenue effects of ﬂat tax reforms. Both of these two inﬂuential pol-
icy studies shied away from empirical analyses of the employment or welfare
effects of a ﬂat income tax system.
Ivanova et al. (2005) use micro-level data to examine the employment ef-
fect of the introduction of a ﬂat tax in Russia in 2001. The main conclusion
is that while revenues increased, this was largely the result of better compli-
ance, while the total (formal and informal) labour supply effect was relatively
1Cited from The Economist (2000).
5limited. A large number of studies have examined the employment effects of
changes to the after-tax pay, and these studies may thus provide insights into
the employment consequences of reforms changing the degree of progression
of the income tax system. It is generally found that economic incentives are
of importance for whether or not individuals work, while their effect on the
number of hours worked by already economically active individuals is minor
(Heckman, 1993; Evers et al., 2005). It has also been found that there are
substantial differences in the labour supply responses across different income
strata, with low income earners typically being more responsive to changes
in after-tax income than high income earners (Kleven and Kreiner, 2006a). It
should therefore be expected that the employment effect of introducing a ﬂat
tax would depend critically on the speciﬁc redistribution of the tax burden, i.e.
on the pre-existing tax schedule and the design of ﬂat tax system.2 Similarly,
the employment effects of changing the basic exemption or the ﬂat tax rate
should depend on the different responses across the taxpayers in the economy.
Gorodnichenko et al. (2008) is the only study that has analysed the welfare
effects of a ﬂat tax reform in a country that has already undertaken such a
policy reform. Gorodnichenko et al. (2008) have access to detailed micro-
data for Russia and show that the increase in revenue after the introduction of
the ﬂat tax in Russia in 2001 partly stemmed from reduced tax evasion and not
from increased economic activity per se. They conclude that the shift from
informal to formal production activities meant that the beneﬁts of the ﬂat tax
reform in Russia are smaller than frequently asserted.
Other studies have considered the hypothetical effects of moving from a
non-proportional income tax system to a proportional one. Aaberge et al.
(2000) use a labour supply model to simulate the effects of revenue-neutral
ﬂat tax reforms in Norway, Sweden and Italy. In Norway, the labour supply
response is estimated to be very elastic and a ﬂat tax reform therefore entails
a substantial increase in employment and social welfare. The consequences
of a ﬂat tax reform are, however, found to be less pronounced in Sweden and
Italy. Cajner et al. (2006) use a general equilibrium model for Slovenia to
simulate the welfare effects of different tax regimes. In their model, a ﬂat tax
regime provides less insurance against income shocks and also reduces labour
market participation in lower income brackets indicating that ﬂat tax systems
are generally outperformed by progressive tax systems in terms of welfare.
Personal income taxation contributes to the wedge between the cost of
labour and the purchasing power of labour, and the main distortionary effect
2Tondani (2006), Rutkowski and Walewski (2007), Bicakova (2006) and Võrk et al.
(2007) are recent papers that analyse the employment effects of taxation for different countries
or country groups using a range of empirical approaches.
6of labour income taxation stems from its impact on taxable labour supply.3 In
line with this reasoning, the empirical analysis in this paper therefore entails
two parts; namely, regression analyses to provide estimates of labour supply
responses followed by simulations to assess the impact of different tax exper-
iments on employment and welfare.
The labour supply responses are estimated for different income groups us-
ing microeconometric methods based on data from the 2005 Estonian Labour
Force Survey. By employing Heckman’s selection model it is possible to dis-
tinguish between the responses along the extensive margin (i.e., labour market
participation or the lack of it) and the intensive margin (i.e., the number of
hours worked by participants). The employment effects of changes in per-
sonal income taxation can be calculated based on the labour supply responses
of the different income groups.
The welfare analysis seeks to determine the marginal cost of public funds
(MCPF) when the government raises revenue by increasing the taxation of
personal income. Speciﬁcally, the MCPF is equal to one plus the excess bur-
den in monetary terms per one currency unit of extra revenue. The MCPF for
each income group depends on a range of factors, including the initial tax rates
and exemptions as well as the group’s labour response, participation rate and
income. The MCPF for each of the groups can be aggregated to provide an
overall measure of the MCPF under different tax policy assumptions.
The estimation of the employment and welfare effects of raising tax rev-
enueisimportantforeconomicpolicymaking. ReliableestimatesoftheMCPF
of taxation are particularly useful (Robson, 2005). First, such estimates may
be used to assess the overall efﬁciency of the tax system; for instance by com-
paring them with similar estimates for other countries. Second, the estimates
may reveal inefﬁciencies within the tax system if, for example, different taxes
exhibit markedly diverging MCPF values, in which case redistributing the tax
burden may reduce the social costs of taxation. Third, the estimates can be
used to assess the welfare effects of new government spending programmes
and how such programmes based on the ﬁnancing of the programmes.
The main contribution of this paper is that it provides numerical estimates
of the welfare costs of personal income taxation for Estonia. As such the paper
represents the ﬁrst study to consider these important aspects of taxation in the
case of Estonia. The study, however, have signiﬁcance beyond the borders
of the Republic. Very few studies have considered the quantitative estimates
of the welfare effect of taxation for the post-communist transition countries.
3Personal income taxation may also potentially have distortionary effects on other eco-
nomic decisions concerning, for instance, education, savings and the incorporation of eco-
nomic activities. These distortions are not considered in this paper.
7More importantly, as mentioned above, only one existing study has explicitly
considered the welfare consequences of a ﬂat or proportional personal income
tax.4
At the methodological level, this paper incorporates a number of relatively
recent advancements in the analysis of the welfare effects of taxation policies.
First, using Heckman’s selection model, the paper explicitly distinguishes be-
tween the extensive and intensive margins of the labour supply. Second, the
paper allows for different labour supply responses across different income
groups. Third, the marginal cost of public funds is found both across dif-
ferent income groups and on the aggregate level. The marginal cost of public
funds is a very useful welfare measure in the context of economic policy.
The focus of the paper is on the effects of taxation across individuals with
different incomes. The empirical literature on labour supply typically ﬁnds
that the labour response of men is less elastic than the response of women.
The labour supply response of the elderly is usually more elastic than that of
younger individuals. It may thus be possible to attain efﬁciency gains by re-
distributing the tax burden from women to men (Alesina et al., 2007) and from
older to younger individuals (Kremer, 1997). However, such policy measures
would be highly controversial and of little immediate relevance; therefore, we
only consider heterogeneous labour supply responses across the income dis-
tribution.
The study should be seen as an initial attempt at trying to assess the em-
ployment and welfare effects of personal income taxation in Estonia. As with
most studies of the effects of taxation, the results are subject to a substantial
margin of error as the derivations are based on restrictive assumptions and nu-
merous simpliﬁcations (see also Browning, 1987). Further empirical analyses
are warranted to pin down more precisely the welfare effects of the Estonian
ﬂat tax regime — and of ﬂat tax systems elsewhere.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 provides
a brief introduction to the Estonian system of taxation. Section 3 provides in-
formation on the Estonian Labour Force Survey and the variables used in the
empirical analysis. Section 4 estimates the labour supply response of different
income groups and examines the possible employment consequences of dif-
ferent tax changes. Section 5 analyses the excess burden arising from raising
extra tax revenue. Section 6 summarises the results, assesses the limitations of
the study and points out areas for future research.
4Gorodnichenko et al. (2008) examine the effect of switching to a system of proportional
income taxation in Russia, while this paper considers the welfare consequences of hypotheti-
cal changes to an already established ﬂat tax system.
82. A primer on the Estonian tax system
The Estonian tax system is well known for its application of ﬂat rates and
—particularlyininternationalcomparison—overallsimplicity. Nevertheless,
aswithallothertaxsystemsinmodernmarketeconomies, theEstoniansystem
exhibits substantial complexity and grey areas where the delimitation between
taxes and non-tax contributions is difﬁcult to ascertain. This section provides
an overview of the main taxes in the Estonian taxation system with the main
focus on the personal income tax, the social tax (social security contribution)
and the unemployment insurance contribution.5 The labour supply estimations
below employ data from 2005, and the rates and exemptions for this year are
therefore spelt out explicitly.
With a major tax reform taking effect in 1994, Estonia thoroughly over-
hauled its system of income taxation and in the process became the ﬁrst coun-
try in Europe to embrace a ﬂat personal income tax (Saavedra et al., 2007).
The overall framework of personal income taxation has remained in place
since 1994, although exemptions and rates have been altered on several oc-
casions, a pension reform has changed the allocation of social tax revenue,
and a compulsory unemployment insurance contribution has been introduced.
The social tax is paid by employers on wage income paid to employees
and on business income by sole proprietors (self-employed in unincorporated
ﬁrms). The social tax amounts to 33 percent of the wage or business income
without any exemptions. In total, 13 percentage points of the social tax are
transferred to the national health fund, while 20 percentage points are ear-
marked for pension contributions. Adults are, with exceptions for students,
pensioners and some part-time employed persons, only eligible for health and
pension coverage if their social tax payment is at least 33 percent of a mini-
mum base amount set in the annual budget; in 2005 this minimum social tax
payment amounted to 231 per month.6 For sole proprietors the social tax is
capped at 33 percent of 15 times the minimum wage; in 2005, the maximum
social tax for sole proprietors was thus 13,316 EEK per month.
A pension reform has phased in a three-pillar system since the end of
the 1990s (Raudla and Staehr, 2003). The ﬁrst pillar is comprised of the
compulsory public pension scheme, the second pillar is made up of contri-
butions to private pension accounts, and the third pillar consists of volun-
5The overview is largely based on information from the Ministry of Finance (2008).
6Estonia has operated a currency board since 1991 with an exchange rate equal to 15.65
EEK/EUR since the in-troduction of the euro in 1999. The purchasing power is, however,
comparatively higher in Estonia than in West European countries. In 2005, the Estonian price
level of ﬁnal consumption by private households amounted to 61% of the average price level
in the EU15 (Eurostat, 2008).
9tary tax-advantaged pension savings. Participation in the second pillar was
made compulsory for younger individuals; middle-aged individuals could de-
cide whether or not to participate, while the elderly could not participate. For
participants in the second pillar, 4 percentage points of the social tax payment
is transferred to a personal pension account along with an additional 2 percent
of the gross wage (paid by the participants). The Estonian pension system
exhibits very high-powered incentives: the individual’s future pension payout
from the ﬁrst pillar depends, to a large extent, on the accumulated contribu-
tions prior to retirement, with only a small minimum pension for individuals
with limited or no contributions. The total payout from a second pillar indi-
vidual account is a function of the contributions paid in and the return on its
investment.
Since 2002 unemployment insurance for employed persons has been oblig-
atory, ﬁnanced by a compulsory unemployment insurance contribution levied
on employees’ salaried income. In 2005 the employer paid 0.5 percent and the
employee 1.0 percent of the salaried income. The insurance contribution rates
have been reduced in later years.
The personal income tax is levied at a ﬂat rate on taxable income exceed-
ing the basic exemption and other personal tax exemptions. Taxable income
comprises on income from employment, business income of non-incorporated
ﬁrms, pensions, interest receipts, rental income etc. Notice, however, that tax-
able income does not include distributed dividends when the underlying proﬁt
is taxed at the ﬁrm level. The latter rule implies that taxable income for most
taxpayers in Estonia comprises only labour income from employment or self-
employment. The ﬂat income tax rate was initially set at 26 percent of taxable
income in excess of exemptions, but the rate was reduced to 24 percent effec-
tive from 2005 and has since been reduced further.
The exemptions comprise the basic exemption and other exemptions. The
basic exemption has been raised several times since the inception of the ﬂat
tax. In 2005, the basic exemption amounted to 20,400 EEK per year or 1,700
EEK per month. Individuals receiving state old-age, disability or survivor’s
pension are entitled to an additional exemption of 36,000 EEK in 2005.7 Par-
ents also have additional exemptions based on the number of children in the
household. Estonian law, furthermore, grants exemptions for a number of ex-
penses such as interest payments on housing loans, educational expenses and
7In 2005 the average pension in Estonia amounted to 2,315 EEK per month or 27,781
EEK per year (Statistics Estonia, 2008b). For the average pensioner, the pension amounts to
a little less than the state pensioners’ additional exemption of 36,000 EEK per year. In other
words, a pensioner receiving the average pension and who takes up employment in order to
earn additional income has a slightly higher exemption (36,000 – 27,782 = 8,212 EEK per
year), but otherwise face the same tax incentives as other taxpayers.
10third pillar pension contributions. The total of these exemptions is capped at
50,000 EEK per year or 50 percent of taxable income. Legally married copies
can ﬁle a joint tax return and in this way share the available exemptions.
The indirect taxes in Estonia are made up of a value added tax (VAT) and
various excise duties. The VAT rate has been levied at 18 percent since 1994
with a lower rate of 5 percent levied on medicines, books and newspapers.
The government levies excise duties on alcohol, tobacco, energy and packag-
ing. Other taxes include taxes on enterprise income, land values and gambling
establishments. Estonia does not levy taxes on property (except land), gifts,
inheritances or wealth.
In 2005, the broad-based taxes on labour and consumption — i.e. the
socialtax, personalincometaxandvalue-addedtax—broughtinmorethan80
percent of the tax revenue of the general consolidated government in Estonia
(Statistics Estonia, 2008a). The social tax and the unemployment insurance
contribution accounted for 34.1 percent of the total tax revenue (10.3 percent
of GDP), the personal income tax accounted for 18.3 percent (5.6 percent of
GDP), and the value added tax 28.1 percent (8.5 percent of GDP).
3. Data
The Estonian Labour Force Survey (ELFS) is undertaken through face-
to-face or telephone interviews by Statistics Estonia. The survey has been
carried out on an annual basis since 1997, but the methodology of collection
was changed considerably in 2000 (European Commission 2004). Data from
ELFS is not published, but has been made available to Eesti Pank for research
purposes.8 This section provides background knowledge on the ELFS, dis-
cusses the limitations of using the ELFS for estimations of the labour supply
and, ﬁnally, describes most of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
The rapid structural and economic changes in the Estonian economy dur-
ing recent years have led us to employ data exclusively from 2005, the most
recent year available at the time of research. Alloja (2005b) ﬁnds somewhat
different labour supply elasticities across different sample years. The sample
comprises 14,605 individuals that have answered at least one question on the
questionnaire.
The Estonian Labour Force Survey takes the household as its unit of data
collection. A household is deﬁned as comprising all individuals who usually
live together and share a common family budget. Thus, members of a house-
8Some documentation of the database, the methodology applied and the survey questions
is available at Statistics Estonia (2008c). See also European Commission (2004).
11hold are mutually dependent in economic terms. All members of the house-
hold aged 15 to 74 (i.e. being of working age) are interviewed. Participation
in the interview is voluntary.
The ELFS has a number of features that makes it suitable for labour supply
estimations at the micro level. First, data on employment, income and back-
ground variables are collected for each individual in the household who is of
working age. This allows for an estimation of a labour supply relationship
where a large set of individual speciﬁc factors can be used as controls. Sec-
ond, the ELFS contains detailed information about all working age individuals
in a household, as well as some information on any dependents present. Con-
sequently, this, in principle, makes it feasible to explain the labour response of
an individual by the behaviour of other individuals in the household.
The main drawback of the ELFS is that the only income variable in the
dataset is the labour income during the last month, net of taxes. There is
no information on pension receipts, unemployment beneﬁts, social assistance,
parental and child exemptions, rents and other forms of capital income, etc.
Thislimitsourabilitytocontrolforheterogeneitystemmingfromthesesources
and also complicates the estimation of the compensated labour supply re-
sponse, which involves an estimation of the labour supply response to — ide-
ally — lump sum income.
The ELFS also lacks other measures of individual characteristics, which
may affect the pay obtained and the supply of labour. This includes variables
reﬂecting the individual’s present state of health and the prevalence of chronic
diseases. A variable indicating membership in a trade union had to be dropped
due to a disproportionate number of missing observations.
The collection of data is stratiﬁed so as to ensure broad geographical cov-
erage, implying an overrepresentation of individuals from the countryside and
an underrepresentation of individuals from the major cities. The oversampling
of countryside individuals implies that unweighted statistical moments based
on the ELFS sample is expected to differ from moments of the Estonian popu-
lation. However, the differences are likely to be relatively minor. For instance,
the weighted average of the hourly post-tax labour income of individuals in
the ELFS sample is approximately 5.5 percent higher than the corresponding
unweighted average. We generally do not use sample weights when undertak-
ing estimations in Section 4, while the weights are used in the simulations of
employment and welfare effects in Section 5.9
9The decision to leave out sample weights from the estimations rests on two factors.
First, the main estimation results are carried out on four subsamples where the main sample
is partitioned based on income levels. The differences between the weighted and unweighted
estimation results in these sub-samples are very small. Second, some estimation procedures
12Labour supply is measured by the variable HOURS, which denotes the
number of hours the interviewed individual usually works in his or her main
job during any given month. The individual can work as an employee, a sole
proprietor, an employer, a freelancer, etc. The variable HOURS is constructed
as the reported “usual” number of working hours in a week multiplied by 4.35.
The variable is equal to 0 if the individual does not participate in the labour
market.
The reliability of the HOURS variable can be cross-checked using the an-
swers to the question where the individual is requested to provide his or her
working hours for the week preceding the interview. The reported usual num-
ber of working hours during a typical week and the actual working hours dur-
ing the last week are very closely correlated and the econometric results us-
ing any of the two measures are essentially identical. Therefore, the variable
HOURS is used as the only measure of monthly working time.
The ELFS also contains information on the number of hours the individ-
ual spends on one or more “second jobs.” Unfortunately, no income data is
available for these second jobs. Relatively few (less than 5 percent of all those
employed, i.e. having HOURS > 0) indicate that they have jobs beside their
main job.
Figure 1 shows the number of observations for intervals of monthly work-
ing time HOURS. The monthly working time results shown clusters at two
points, namely HOURS = 0 and HOURS = 174 corresponding, respectively, to
no employment and employment 40 hours per week. The variation around the
40 hours of employment per week is limited. This may suggest that changes in
post-tax labour income are unlikely to have a substantial effect on employment
due to the choice of hours (intensive margin) — a result which is conﬁrmed in
the econometric analyses in Section 4.
An interesting ﬁnding from the ELFS is the relatively high participation
rates in Estonia. Overall, 8009 or 54.8 percent of all persons aged 15–74
years old are employed. The employment rate is 57.8 percent among men
and 52.3 percent among women. The overall participation rate is held down
by the participation rate of the elderly; in 2005, the participation rate among
individuals between 55 and 74 years old was 36.4 percent.
Labour income during the last month net of the social security contribution,
unemployment insurance contribution and income tax for each individual of
working age is denoted by PAY. Evidently, individuals who are not working
(e.g. Maximum Likelihood estimation of Heckman’s selection model) cannot be undertaken
in the Stata estimation programme using sample weights. Overall, we have concluded that
the costs of using sample weights in the form of lower precision of the coefﬁcient estimates

















































HOURS (intervals of 20 hours)
Figure 1: Monthly working hours, intervals of 20 hours
Source: ELFS, 2005; author’s calculations.
will have PAY = 0. The construction of the variable PAY brought up two
minor issues. First, 1843 individuals had indicated monthly working times
above 0 (in most cases 40 hours per week corresponding to 174 hours per
month), but had either not answered the question concerning labour income
in the preceding month and, consequently, PAY is coded as missing for these
individuals.
A more worrying possibility is a bias towards underreporting of income
in the ELFS (2005). When non-working individuals are excluded, the average
monthlypost-taxlabourincomePAYis4,643EEK.StatisticsEstoniaconducts
a separate survey among enterprises to ascertain the monthly wage of their
employees, and the average full-time equivalent net wage was according to
this methodology 6,430 EEK for 2005 (Statistics Estonia, 2008d).
The Estonian Tax and Customs Board reports the average taxable (i.e. pre-
tax) income of Estonians ﬁling tax returns and report the number in an annual
press release. For 2005 the average taxable income was 7,562 EEK for in-
dividuals with annual income above 0 EEK for the year (EMTA, 2008). If it
(unrealistically) is assumed that all individuals have income above 1,700 EEK,
then the after-tax tax income can be calculated as approximately 6,155 EEK.
The heavy right-hand tail of the Estonian income distribution may not ren-
der it very informative to compare averages of income distributions, but the
discrepancy is still so substantial that it warrants some discussion.
14First, the discrepancy cannot be explained by the stratiﬁcation of the ELFS
sample. The weighted average monthly post-tax labour income PAY is 4,924
EEK, which is 6 percent above the unweighted measure, but still 23 percent
below the wage measure from Statistics Estonia.
Second, the different measures are not directly comparable. For instance,
the ELFS measure comprises all labour income (including income from self-
employment), while the Statistics Estonia measure only includes wage income
earned by employees. The income measure from the Estonian Tax and Cus-
toms Board also comprise non-labour taxable income like pensions etc.
Third, the analyses in Subsection 4.2 seeking to predict the labour income
of individuals based on their individual characteristics show that in particular
persons with high predicted labour income have failed to report their income
in the ELFS. In conclusion, the likely underreporting of labour income by
especially high income individuals in the ELFS (2005) implies that labour
supply estimations based on that dataset must be interpreted with caution. We
return to these issues when discussing the estimation and simulation results.
The vast majority of economically active individuals work 174 hours per
month, butothersworkeithermoreorlessthanthistotal. Therefore, inorderto
obtain a measure of the return on supplying labour, it is necessary to calculate
the hourly labour income. The hourly income for active individuals is found
as HPAY = PAY/HOURS, for HOURS > 0.
In the econometric speciﬁcations in Section 4, we will frequently employ
logarithmic values of the monthly working time and hourly labour income.
A pre-imposed “L” indicates the natural logarithm of the variable. Thus,
LHOURS denotes the log of the number of hours worked per month and
LHPAY denotes the log of the income per hour. Figure 2 shows a scatter plot
of the logarithm of the monthly number of working hours and the logarithm of
the hourly pay. The concentration of observations with monthly working times
equal to 174 (LHOURS = 5.16) is noticeable. No clear correlation pattern is
discernable from the plot.
The Labour Force Survey allows us to include a large number of back-
ground variables. The centred and scaled age of the interviewed individual is
denoted by AGE, with AGE2 being the square of AGE. The variable FEMALE
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual is a woman. The
dummy variable ESTCITI is equal to 1 if the interviewed individual is an Es-
tonian citizen, while ESTETHN is 1 if the individual is of Estonian ethnicity.
The language variable LANGEST takes the value 1 if the ﬁrst language of
the interviewed individual is Estonian, whereas LANGOTH is 1 if the inter-
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Figure 2: Hourly labour income and monthly working time, logarithms
Source: ELFS, 2005; author’s calculations.
The education acquired by the interviewed individuals is captured by the
variables ISCED01, ..., ISCED6 following the classiﬁcation by UNESCO
in the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (UNESCO, 1997).
The lowest education level ISCED01 denotes that the interviewed individual
only has a pre-primary or primary education; while the highest level ISCED6
denotes that the person has a graduate university degree.10
For individuals who at the time of the interview were studying at the sec-
ondary level, the dummy variable STUDYSEC takes the value of 1. For indi-
viduals studying at the tertiary level, the variable STUDYTER takes the value
of 1.
The variable ADULTS denotes the number of individuals from 15 to 74
years old living in the same household as the interviewed individual, while
DEPENDENTS is the number of individuals below 15 and above 74 in the
household. The dummy variable MARRIED takes the value 1 if the individual
is married or lives in a common marriage relationship.
A number of variables capturing the location of the domicile of the indi-
vidual are also available. The dummy variables REGNORTH, REGEAST,
REGSOUTH and REGWEST indicate the geographical region. The variables
are coded based on the county in which the individual lives. The regions are
10There are very few individuals who only have a pre-primary education (ISCED 0) and
they have been included in the group of individuals with only a primary education (ISCED 1).
The resulting group of individuals with at most a primary education is labelled ISCED01.
16chosen to be relatively large in order to reduce the prevalence of individu-
als living in one region and working in another region. The dummy variable
TALLINN is equal to 1 if the individual lives in the capital.11 The dummy
variable RURAL is equal to 1 if the individual lives in the countryside.
Finally, two variables relate explicitly to the working time of working in-
dividuals. The variable PARTTIME is a simple dummy variable indicating
whether the interviewed individual works part time in his or her main job. The
dummy variable WORKMORE captures whether the individual would like
to work more hours in his or her job. Part-time employment is relatively in-
frequent in Estonia, cf. also Figure 1. Part-time employment is not always
desired by the employee, but may be dictated by the employment situation;
the correlation between PARTTIME and WORKMORE is 0.35. Table 1 lists
the variables and provides a brief description along with selected summary
statistics.12
4. Estimation of labour supply
4.1. Modelling labour supply
Labour supply decisions are part of the overall time allocation problem of
individuals (Feldstein, 1999; Robson, 2005). An individual has 24 hours each
day of the year available and has to decide how much time to work in the
formal part of the economy where the returns on labour are taxable and how
much to devote to other activities including:
• Formal sector work, where taxation can be avoided through legal means.
• Informal sector work, i.e. work where the taxation is evaded.
• Non-taxable production activity, e.g. home production.
• Education and training activity.
• Unemployment or other inactivity with social transfers.
• Economic inactivity without social transfers.
When analysing the effect of taxation on (formal) employment, the main
distinction is between taxable labour supply and other uses of time, as taxation
only affects the return on taxable work, while generally leaving the returns on
11Tallinn is situated in the northern region, so REGNORTH = 1 if TALLINN = 1, while
TALLINN = 1 does not necessarily imply that REGNORTH = 1.
12A Stata programme generating the variables used in this study from the data in ELFS
(2005) can be obtained from the author upon request.
17Table 1: Notation, description and summary statistics of main variables
(1.1)  (1.2)  (1.3)  (1.4) 
Variable  Definition and description   Mean  S.D. 
AGE  Age of individual minus sample mean 42.8 and divided by 100  0.000  0.172 
AGE2  AGE squared  0.030  0.028 
FEMALE  1 if individual is a woman, 0 otherwise  0.531  0.499 
ESTCITI  1 if individual is an Estonian citizen, 0 otherwise  0.871  0.335 
ESTETHN  1 if individual is of Estonian ethnicity, 0 otherwise  0.764  0.424 
LANGEST  1 if Estonian is native language of individual, 0 otherwise  0.762  0.426 
LANGOTH  1 if individual knows at least one non-native language, 0 otherwise  0.862  0.345 
ISCED01  1 if highest education is at the pre-primary or primary level, 0 oth-
erwise  0.054  0.226 
ISCED2  1 if highest education is at the lower secondary level, 0 otherwise  0.210  0.407 
ISCED3  1 if highest education is at the upper secondary level, 0 otherwise  0.441  0.497 
ISCED4 
1 if highest education is at the post-secondary non-tertiary level, 0 
otherwise  0.058  0.234 
ISCED5  1 if highest education is at the lower tertiary level, 0 otherwise  0.227  0.419 
ISCED6  1 if highest education is at the higher tertiary level, 0 otherwise  0.004  0.061 
MARRIED  1 if individual is married or lives in a common-law relationship, 0 
otherwise  0.566  0.496 
ADULTS  Number of persons in the household aged 15 to 74 years old  2.683  1.139 
DEPENDENTS 
Number of persons in the household below 15 and above 74 years 
old  0.562  0.889 
REGEAST  1 if individual lives in the eastern region, 0 otherwise  0.187  0.390 
REGNORTH  1 if individual lives in the northern region, 0 otherwise  0.307  0.461 
REGSOUTH  1 if individual lives in the southern region, 0 otherwise  0.333  0.471 
REGWEST  1 if individual lives in the western region, 0 otherwise  0.172  0.378 
TALLINN  1 if individual lives in the capital, 0 otherwise  0.157  0.363 
RURAL  1 if individual lives in a rural area, 0 otherwise  0.450  0.497 
STUDYSEC  1 if individual studies at the secondary level, i.e. ISCED classifica-
tions 2-4, 0 otherwise  0.122  0.327 
STUDYTER  1 if individual studies at the tertiary level, i.e. ISCED classifications 
5-6, 0 otherwise  0.048  0.214 
PRIMARY  1 if individual works in primary sector, otherwise 0  0.049  0.215 
SECONDARY  1 if individual works in secondary sector, otherwise 0  0.186  0.389 
TERTIARY  1 if individual works in tertiary sector, otherwise 0  0.315  0.464 
PARTTIME  1 if individual works part time, 0 otherwise  0.048  0.214 
WORKMORE 
1 if individual works but would prefer to work longer hours, 0 oth-
erwise  0.023  0.149 
HOURS
a)  “Usual” monthly working time in hours, 0 if individual does not 
work  94.568  89.347 
LHOURS  Natural logarithm of HOURS  5.123  0.269 
PAY
b)  Net of tax labour income per month, EEK  2,294.79  3,266.72 
HPAY
c)  Net of tax labour income per hour for working individuals, EEK; 
HPAY = PAY/HOURS if HOURS > 0 
13.55  18.93 
LHPAY  Natural logarithm of HPAY  3.233  0.495 
RESTPAY  Sum of labour income of all other household members, EEK  3,722.81  4,809.33 
LRESTPAY  Natural logarithm of PAYREST  8.600  0.639 
  a) When non-working individuals are excluded, the mean of HOURS is 172.451 and the standard deviation is 33.545.
b) When non-working individuals are excluded, the mean of PAY is 4642.76 EEK and the standard deviation is
3270.60 EEK. c) When non-working individuals are excluded, the mean of HPAY is 27.42 EEK and the standard
deviation is 18.567 EEK.
Source: Variables constructed based on data from ELFS (2005).
18the other activities unchanged. The distinction between the many different ac-
tivities beyond formal employment is still useful in different contexts. First,
the choice of control variables in the labour supply estimations should take
into account the returns on the many different activities available and thus not
presume that non-working individuals are inactive. The ease with which indi-
viduals can avoid or evade taxation, engage in home production, obtain social
transfers, etc. will be important determinants of the individual’s allocation of
time. Second, as explained in Section 5, the welfare cost of a tax increase will
depend on how much initial tax revenue the tax increase displaces. The choice
of activities when not working in the formal sector may affect, for example,
the revenue intake of consumption taxes and, therefore, the welfare costs of
taxation.
The Estonian Labour Force Survey only contains information on whether
an individual works (presumably in the formal, taxed sector) or does not work.
Consequently, it is impossible to fully model the choice of time allocation, and
we have to resort to estimating only the formal labour supply as a function of
the hourly after-tax return on employment and various control variables.
In practice it is difﬁcult to devise the control variables to be included in the
labour supply estimation. Most of the control variables will — in principle
— be observable, but others might be essentially unobservable characteristics
as e.g. the individual’s stamina, physical strength, norms, etc. Even among
the observable characteristics, it is often difﬁcult to obtain the required infor-
mation. For instance, the ELFS does not contain information on whether a
non-working individual receives non-labour income such as an old-age pen-
sion, disability pension, unemployment beneﬁts, social welfare or possibly
engages in informal sector activities.13
The preceding discussion has implicitly assumed that working time is con-
tinuous in the sense that the individual can choose any number of working
hours. In practice, the norms, legislation or ﬁxed costs of employment often
makethechoiceofworkingtimediscontinuoussothat, forexample, veryshort
weekly or daily working hours are not feasible choices (Heckman, 1993). The
data from the ELFS indicates that indeed very few individuals report working
less than 20 hours per week in Estonia, cf. Figure 1 in Section 2.
When this discontinuity is taken into account, decisions regarding working
time can conveniently be thought of as entailing two steps. The individual
must decide whether or not to participate in the formal labour market (the
extensive margin) and, in the case of participation, then how many hours to
13However, this lack of information may not be a big problem in the case of Estonia as
pensions are generally not dependent on other sources of income, unemployment beneﬁts are
relatively small and of limited duration, and welfare payments are small.
19work (the intensive margin). The two choices are clearly interrelated as, for
example, the set of feasible working hours will affect the decision regarding
participation.
The distinction between the intensive and the extensive margins is partic-
ularly important when ascertaining the employment and welfare costs of tax-
ation (Kleven and Kreiner, 2006a). First, the marginal tax rate affects the
choice along the intensive margin, whereas the average tax rate affects the
choice along the extensive margin. Second, the return on employment affects
the intensive choice through both substitution and income effects, but affects
the extensive choice only through the substitution effect (as no taxable income
is earned when the individual is not working).
A minor complication relates to the fact that the labour supply elastici-
ties may differ across different types of individuals. For many countries it
is well established that males and females exhibit different (uncompensated)
labour supply elasticities. It is also conceivable that the labour supply response
will vary across individuals depending on their age and whether the individual
is employed or self-employed. We have decided against estimating separate
labour supply regressions for these groups. First, some of the groups would
end up with relatively few data points reducing the precision with which the
coefﬁcients are estimated. Second, while tax policy can target different in-
come groups (e.g. via the size of the basic exemption and different marginal
tax rates dependent on income) it is often assumed to be unacceptable to make
personal income taxation dependent on characteristics such as gender or age.
Thus, we seek to determine an average estimate of the labour supply response
to economic incentives.
It follows from the preceding discussion that the micro-econometric esti-
mation of labour supply responses is complicated by several factors. First,
the labour supply is likely to exhibit non-convexities as the individual decides
whether or not to participate (the extensive margin) and — in the case of par-
ticipation — the number of hours worked (the intensive margin). Second, for
non-participants no data is available on the labour income these individuals
are forsaking, i.e. the income they would be able to obtain if they were to
enter the labour market. Third, for working individuals the decision regarding
working hours may affect their hourly labour income. If left unaddressed, the
endogeneity could give rise to biased coefﬁcient estimates.
The standard solution to these problems is to employ a special version of
Heckman’s selection model, where the return on labour is “instrumented” or
predicted based on the characteristics of the individual. We implement Heck-
man’s selection model in the following phases: Subsection 4.2 derives the
predicted hourly labour income for both working and non-working individu-
20als, Subsection 4.3 estimates the Heckman model for the whole sample and
Subsection 4.4 provides estimates of the Heckman model on sample quartiles.
4.2. Predicted hourly pay
The ﬁrst stage entails the estimation of log hourly labour income (LHPAY)
as a function of a range of characteristics of individuals participating in the
labour market, including age, gender, ethnicity, language skills, education and
geographical residence. Using these variables, it is possible to construct a pre-
dicted log hourly income for all individuals in the sample. The predicted log
hourly income can then be used as an explanatory variable in the employment
estimation. For working individuals, the use of predicted or instrumented val-
ues may reduce the risk of simultaneity bias in the estimated coefﬁcients in
the employment estimation. For non-working individuals, the construction of
predicted or “notional” log hourly labour income facilitates the estimation of
the effect of economic incentives on labour market participation.
Table 2 shows the results for two different speciﬁcations. It follows from
(2.1) that most of the explanatory variables are statistically signiﬁcant and
have coefﬁcients that are readily interpretable. There is an inverse U-shaped
relationship between age and log hourly income with the maximum hourly
income occurring for individuals who are approximately 36 years old. The
coefﬁcientofthedummyvariableforwomenispreciselyestimatedandofvery
substantial magnitude. Taken literally, the point estimate suggests that women
earn 29.3 percent less than men even when controlling for a range of other
individual characteristics. Gender “pay gaps” of rather similar magnitudes are
found in Võrk (2004), Rõõm and Kallaste (2004) and Alloja (2005a).
Language skills affect income in a positive direction. Being of Estonian na-
tionality may also increase hourly income, but the effect is relatively modest
in size and not very precisely estimated. The ethnicity variable is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. The pay gaps based on nationality or ethnicity are ar-
guably somewhat smaller than the corresponding measures found in Leping
and Toomet (2007). Education affects income positively. Hourly incomes are
higher in the northern region of Estonia, but living in Tallinn does not appear
to bring about an additional effect. People living in rural areas have substan-
tially lower income than people living elsewhere. Overall, the results are com-
mensurable with previous microeconometric studies analysing wage or labour
income formation in Estonia (Siliverstovs and Koulikov, 2002; Võrk, 2004;
Alloja, 2005a). Before proceeding, we will discuss three possible problems
concerning speciﬁcation (2.1).
First, the determination of income may change across 2005 due to seasonal
factors and a rapidly growing economy. Column (2.2) shows the results when
21Table 2: Estimations of log labour income per hour of employed individuals
(LHPAY)
  (2.1)  (2.2) 
  LHPAY  LHPAY 
  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
AGE  -0.456
***  (0.045)  -0.453
***  (0.045) 
AGE2  -3.200
***  (0.364)  -3.208
***  (0.363) 
FEMALE  -0.293
***  (0.011)  -0.292
***  (0.011) 
ESTCITI  0.047
**  (0.021)  0.045
**  (0.021) 
ESTETHN  0.012  (0.029)  0.010  (0.029) 
LANGEST  0.190
***  (0.029)  0.193
***  (0.029) 
LANGOTH  0.094
***  (0.017)  0.098
***  (0.017) 
ISCED2  0.309
***  (0.025)  0.347
***  (0.031) 
ISCED3  0.444
***  (0.022)  0.482
***  (0.029) 
ISCED4  0.427
***  (0.026)  0.466
***  (0.032) 
ISCED5  0.724
***  (0.023)  0.759
***  (0.029) 
ISCED6  1.156
***  (0.110)  1.189
***  (0.111) 
REGSOUTH  -0.187
***  (0.018)  -0.187
***  (0.018) 
REGEAST  -0.127
***  (0.021)  -0.125
***  (0.021) 
REGWEST  -0.191
***  (0.020)  -0.191
***  (0.020) 
TALLINN  -0.007  (0.022)  -0.010  (0.022) 
RURAL  -0.136***  (0.013)  -0.139***  (0.013) 
CONSTANT  2.820***  (0.029)  -0.453***  (0.045) 
R
2  0.265    0.269   
No. of obs.  6,078    6,078   
  Notes: Standard errors (S.E.) are shown in brackets beside the coefﬁcient estimates. The superscripts ***, ** and
* indicate that the null hypothesis of the coefﬁcient being equal to 0 is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of
conﬁdence, respectively. Monthly dummies are included, but not shown, in regression (2.2).
monthly dummies for the ﬁrst 11 months are added. (The dummy for Decem-
ber is omitted to avoid a perfect correlation across the explanatory variables).
It follows that the econometric results change very little when monthly dum-
miesareadded. Amongthemonthlydummies, onlythedummyforMarchwas
statistically signiﬁcant (not shown). The share of explained variation increases
only marginally when monthly dummies are added. Therefore, we conclude
that seasonal and trend factors are unimportant for wage determination in the
current data sample.
Second, it would have been desirable to include sector, ﬁrm and job func-
tion speciﬁc variables into the labour income regression. Average wages vary
markedly across these dimensions, and sector, ﬁrm and job speciﬁc variables
would have helped explain individual labour income (Rõõm and Kallaste,
2004). However, the inclusion of such variables would rule out the “predic-
tion” of pay for non-working individuals since ﬁrm, sector and job speciﬁc
information is unavailable for these individuals.
Third, speciﬁcation (2.1) is based only on working individuals and thus it is
implicitly assumed that all individuals can enter the labour market and obtain
thepredictednotionalhourlyincome. Inotherwords, non-workingindividuals
are assumed to abstain from working solely because of insufﬁcient economic
22incentives. This assumption may not be entirely realistic as factors like hand-
icaps, addiction or (very) old age can make it impossible for the individual to
enter the labour market irrespective of the attainable pay. We have also de-
veloped a model of hourly pay with a selection whose ﬁrst step determines
whether or not the individual participates in the labour market (Bicakova et
al., 2006). Whereas the pay regression in the selection model differs some-
what from the speciﬁcation in (2.1), the subsequent second stage employment
estimation does not differ substantially from the corresponding results when
(2.1) is used.
We use speciﬁcation (2.1) to predict the pay for all individuals in our sam-
ple, including the approximately 1600 individuals who reported no income in
spite of being active in the labour market and the approximately 6600 indi-
viduals who are not working. The predicted or “notional” logarithmic hourly
income is denoted by LHPAYHAT, where the postﬁx HAT signiﬁes that the
variable is predicted. The average predicted notional log hourly rate for non-
employed individuals is 2.97 (corresponding to an hourly income of 19.49
EEK) and hence substantially below the corresponding rate of 3.25 (equiva-
lent to an hourly income of 25.78 EEK) for employed individuals. The result
may suggest that non-participating individuals are partly discouraged by a lack
of economic incentives.
4.3. Labour supply with selection
This subsection presents the results of Heckman’s selection model for the
labour supply decision of individuals using the full ELFS sample (see Appen-
dix A for estimations without selection). The labour supply of an individual
is taken to depend on the notional log hourly after-tax pay as well as a range
of individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, family composi-
tion, educational activities, etc. The decision regarding participation and the
number of hours worked are estimated using Heckman’s two-step procedure,
where the selection bias in the hours regression is corrected by the inclusion
of the inverse Mill’s ratio derived in the ﬁrst stage selection regression.
We have chosen to identify the selection and the hours regressions through
the non-linearity of the inverse Mill’s ratio. As in many other empirical im-
plementations of Heckman’s selection model, there is not a straightforward
way of ﬁnding variables suitable for the identiﬁcation. The challenge is to
ﬁnd variables that ex ante (from a theoretical viewpoint) would be expected to
affect the decision regarding participation but not the decision regarding work-
ing hours. Such variables are generally not available in labour supply models
(Hogan, 2004).
23Vella (1997) surveys a number of studies applying Heckman’s selection
model and concludes that identiﬁcation through the non-linearity of the in-
verse Mills ratio provides satisfactory results provided the explanatory vari-
ables exhibit sufﬁcient variability. In light of this ﬁnding and the problems
ﬁnding identifying variables, we have chosen not to include variables in the
selection regression which do not appear in the hours regression.14
The upper panel of Table 3 shows the results of the choice of participation,
whereas the lower panel shows the results of the choice of working hours by
individuals participating in the formal labour market. The marginal effects are
reported for the participation regression. For non-dummy explanatory vari-
ables, the marginal effect is calculated for the average value of the variable;
for dummy variables the marginal effect denotes the change in the probabil-
ity of employment when the variable increases from 0 to 1. The choice of a
“double log speciﬁcation” (i.e., both working hours and net-of-tax income in
logarithms) implies that the intensive margin labour supply elasticity follows
directly from the hours regression.
It follows from the main speciﬁcation in Column (3.1) that the decisions
regarding hours and participation are not generally driven by the same factors.
A large number of factors helps explain the decision regarding participation,
while only relatively few of the explanatory variables enter signiﬁcantly into
the working hours regression. The latter result is consistent with the limited
variability in the variable LHOURS.
The estimated coefﬁcient of the notional log pay per hour, LHPAYHAT, in
the selection regression is positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant, while it
is negative and signiﬁcant in the working hours regression. The control vari-
ables enter the speciﬁcation in reasonable ways. The elderly are more likely
not to be employed than younger individuals and they work shorter hours if
they do work. Women are more likely to work than men, but they work shorter
hours. Higher education increases the probability of employment, but has no
effect on the number of hours worked. Married individuals are more likely
to be employed, but work shorter hours than individuals who are not married.
The number of children or elderly dependents in the household decreases the
likelihood of an individual working. Individuals working in the primary and
14We have undertaken a number of robustness checks to examine the impact of this choice.
In one case we chose to identify the selection by a dummy for residence in the countryside
(RURAL) based on the argument that longer distances and less well-developed public trans-
portation make it less attractive to participate in the labour market, but might have little impact
on the number of working hours of working individuals. This and other experiments with
different (rather arbitrary) identiﬁcation restrictions revealed that the choice of identiﬁcation
restrictions only has a minor impact on the estimation results, and we have therefore chosen
to continue to identify the selection and the hours regressions through the non-linearity of the
inverse Mill’s ratio.
24Table 3: Estimations of monthly logarithmic working hours with selection
  (3.1)  (3.2)  (3.3)  (3.4) 
  Selection  Selection  Selection  Selection 
  Marg. eff.  S.E.  Marg. eff.  S.E.  Marg. eff.  S.E.  Marg. eff.  S.E. 
LHPAYHAT  0.590
***  (0.040)  0.590
***  (0.040)  0.336
***  (0.063)  0.515
***  (0.047) 
AGE  -0.289
***  (0.047)  -0.289
***  (0.047)  -0.354
***  (0.074)  -0.250
***  (0.052) 
AGE2  -7.744
***  (0.273)  -7.744
***  (0.273)  -9.828
***  (0.500)  -8.622
***  (0.323) 
FEMALE  0.082
***  (0.015)  0.082
***  (0.015)  -0.032  (0.025)  0.009  (0.018) 
ISCED2  0.046  (0.035)  0.046  (0.035)  0.220
***  (0.056)  0.107
***  (0.040) 
ISCED3  0.075
**  (0.037)  0.075
**  (0.037)  0.282
***  (0.059)  0.154
***  (0.043) 
ISCED4  0.098**  (0.040)  0.098**  (0.040)  0.260***  (0.056)  0.151***  (0.043) 
ISCED5  0.075
*  (0.044)  0.075
*  (0.044)  0.267
***  (0.065)  0.152
***  (0.049) 
ISCED6  0.201
**  (0.094)  0.201
**  (0.094)  0.368
***  (0.098)  0.334
***  (0.065) 
MARRIED  0.077
***  (0.012)  0.077
***  (0.012)  0.045
**  (0.023)  0.068
***  (0.015) 
ADULTS  0.015
***  (0.005)  0.015
***  (0.005)  -0.006  (0.009)  0.017
***  (0.007) 
DEPENDENTS  -0.045
***  (0.006)  -0.045
***  (0.006)  -0.094
***  (0.009)  -0.046
***  (0.006) 
STUDYSEC  -0.419
***  (0.018)  -0.419
***  (0.018)  -0.434
***  (0.025)  -0.416
***  (0.021) 
STUDYTER  -0.287
***  (0.019)  -0.287
***  (0.019)  -0.308
***  (0.025)  -0.311
***  (0.021) 
LPAYREST  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.035
***  (0.014)  ..  .. 
LPAYRESTHAT  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.004  (0.008) 
Total obs.  14,567  14,567  6,258  12,129 
  LHOURS  LHOURS  LHOURS  LHOURS 
  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
LHPAYHAT  -0.219***  (0.037)  -0.063***  (0.024)  -0.175***  (0.057)  -0.174***  (0.036) 
AGE  -0.122
***  (0.037)  -0.085
***  (0.023)  0.010  (0.075)  -0.134
***  (0.038) 
AGE2  -0.366  (0.496)  -1.163
***  (0.336)  2.413
*  (1.254)  -0.087  (0.564) 
FEMALE  -0.099
***  (0.011)  -0.041
***  (0.006)  -0.047
**  (0.019)  -0.078
***  (0.011) 
ISCED2  -0.041  (0.033)  -0.004  (0.023)  -0.213
***  (0.073)  -0.066
*  (0.039) 
ISCED3  -0.053  (0.034)  0.014  (0.024)  -0.248
***  (0.787)  -0.081
**  (0.040) 
ISCED4  -0.056  (0.036)  0.013  (0.025)  -0.252
***  (0.081)  -0.076
*  (0.042) 
ISCED5  -0.054  (0.037)  0.022  (0.025)  -0.249
***  (0.084)  -0.086
**  (0.043) 
ISCED6  -0.078  (0.063)  -0.006  (0.038)  -0.160  (0.136)  -0.096  (0.071) 
MARRIED  -0.033
***  (0.009)  -0.004  (0.005)  -0.034
*  (0.018)  -0.027
***  (0.010) 
ADULTS  -0.003  (0.003)  -0.002  (0.002)  -0.001  (0.007)  -0.004  (0.004) 
DEPENDENTS  0.008*  (0.005)  -0.001  (0.003)  0.040***  (0.012)  0.006  (0.005) 
STUDYSEC  -0.012  (0.041)  -0.067**  (0.030)  0.049  (0.087)  -0.060  (0.044) 
STUDYTER  -0.026  (0.023)  0.001  (0.015)  0.063  (0.049)  0.012  (0.026) 
PRIMARY  0.080
***  (0.010)  0.091
***  (0.007)  0.057
***  (0.021)  0.089
***  (0.010) 
SECONDARY  0.035
***  (0.006)  -0.004  (0.004)  0.026
**  (0.011)  0.031
***  (0.007) 
WORKMORE  -0.358
***  (0.014)  -0.015  (0.010)  -0.347
***  (0.027)  -0.377
***  (0.014) 
PARTTIME  ..  ..  -0.725
***  (0.007)  ..  ..  ..  .. 
LPAYREST  ..  ..  ..  ..  -0.005  (0.011)  ..  .. 
LPAYRESTHAT  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  -0.003  (0.005) 
CONSTANT  6.094
***  (0.141)  5.422
***  (0.094)  6.144
***  (0.255)  5.980
***  (0.141) 
Mill’s lambda  -0.279
***  (0.039)  -0.008  (0.028)  -0.383
***  (0.087)  -0.259
***  (0.043) 
Uncensored obs.  7,983  7,983  3,491  6,949 
  Notes: The marginal effects and their standard errors are shown in the selection regression. For the dummy variables,
the marginal effect is the discrete change of the variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors (S.E.) are shown in brackets
beside the coefﬁcient estimates. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate that the null hypothesis of the coefﬁcient
being equal to 0 is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of conﬁdence, respectively.
25secondarysectorsworklongerhoursthanindividualsinthetertiarysector. Un-
surprisingly, students have a lower probability of participation than individuals
who do not study.
The negative elasticity of the hours worked in (3.1) is a surprising result.
If taken literally, a 1 percent increase in after-tax hourly income would lead
to 0.6 percentage point more individuals being employed, but the number of
working hours among individuals already working would fall by 0.2 percent.
The result that changes in hourly net-of-tax pay mainly affects the choice of
participation and to a much smaller extent the choice of hours is consistent
with most studies. There are other empirical studies that have found intensive
labour supply elasticities in the vicinity of –0.2, but most studies suggest that
the elasticity is higher (Evers, 2005). The intensive elasticity estimated in
(3.1) is also substantially below the elasticities found in Estonian studies based
on data from earlier years (Võrk, 2004; Alloja, 2005a, b). In the following
paragraphs we discuss the negative elasticity of hours worked in (3.1) in more
detail.
The ﬁrst approach is to consider whether the negative coefﬁcient could be
related to the choice of sample and estimation techniques. When (3.1) is re-
estimated using different subsamples (men and women separately, different
age groups), the negative intensive elasticity prevails although the estimated
coefﬁcient is not always statistically signiﬁcant. Re-estimating the model in
(3.1)usingMaximumLikelihoodyieldsresultsverysimilartotheresultsusing
the two-step procedure.
The second approach builds on the conception that an individual might
work fewer hours because of personal characteristics otherwise not controlled
for or because a job with longer hours is not available. This might bias the
estimated coefﬁcient of the hourly after-tax pay if the working time affects the
hourly remuneration.15
Estimation (3.2) includes the variable PARTTIME in the working hours
part of the model to control for a possible reverse causality from the choice
of working time to hourly pay. The selection part of the model is unchanged
as the additional variable does not enter in this part. In the hours part several
coefﬁcients change substantially, as would be expected. Most strikingly, the
coefﬁcient of the notional log hourly pay LHPAYHAT is now estimated at
–0.05, which (in numerical terms) is substantially below the estimate found
in (3.1). The coefﬁcient is also imprecisely estimated and only signiﬁcant at
15An example would be an individual who cannot hold a full time job because of bad
health and who therefore chooses to work only half time. If at the same time the part-time job
has a better hourly pay (e.g., directorships, consultancy work, teaching, etc.), then the lack of
control for part-time employment will bias the estimated coefﬁcient of the notional log hourly
pay downwards.
26the 10 percent level. This result suggests that the large negative coefﬁcient
estimate of LHPAYHAT is largely related to individuals taking up part-time
work, usually working around 87 hours per month.16
The third approach seeks to exploit the restrictions on the labour income
elasticity imposed by theory. Economic theory does not impose sign restric-
tions on the uncompensated or Marshallian elasticity directly, but only on the
compensated or Hicksian elasticity. The compensated elasticity is derived
from the uncompensated elasticity by removing the income effect so as to iso-
late the substitution effect. The compensated intensive margin labour supply
elasticity must be non-negative. The compensated elasticity is also used for
the estimation of the excess burden of taxation affecting the number of hours
worked for economically active individuals.
The (numerically) large negative estimated coefﬁcient of LHPAYHAT in
the working hours regression in (3.1) suggests that the income effect must be
very strong. The income effect should ideally be estimated based on data on
lump sum income, but individuals do not receive lump sum income in practice
and the ELFS dataset contains only information on labour income.
In order to obtain estimates of how income not earned by the individual
affects the labour supply of the individual, we have decided to include the log-
arithmic labour income of other individuals in the household.17 This variable,
LPAYREST,isclearlyanimperfect proxyoflump-sumincome, butithasbeen
utilised in other studies (Hogan, 2004; Bicakova et al., 2006; Tandani, 2006).
Column (3.3) in Table 3 shows the estimation when LPAYREST is included
in both the selection and working hours regressions. The results indicate that
the logarithmic income of the other household members enters with a positive
and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient in the selection regression, while it is insigniﬁcant
in the working hours regression.18 Taken literally, the results suggest that a
higher income from other household members leads to a higher probability of
employment.
The poor results obtained when LPAYREST is included may result from
the income of other household members being dependent of the income of the
individual. To reduce this form of endogeneity bias, we instrumented the in-
come of all individuals in the household using the same set of individual char-
acteristics as used in the instrumentation of LHPAY in Table 2. The variable
16This conclusion is also conﬁrmed if the estimation in Column (3.1) is redone on a sample
restricted to individuals working more than 100 hours per month (not shown). The coefﬁcient
estimate of LHPAYHAT is insigniﬁcant in this case.
17This is admittedly a rather ad hoc approach to modelling the interdependence of eco-
nomic decisions within a household (see e.g. Chiappori, 1988).
18The estimated coefﬁcient of the individual’s own pay, LHPAYHAT, is markedly lower in
(3.3) than in (3.1), which is the result of the two income measures being positively correlated.
27LPAYRESTHAT is calculated as the sum of the instrumented labour income
of all other members of the household. Column (3.4) shows the results when
the instrumented income proxy is used, but the results are once again unim-
pressive as the variable is insigniﬁcant, both in the selection and the working
hours regressions.
The estimations using household income variables did not show that higher
labour income from other household members led the individual to reduce his
or her labour supply as would be expected. In other words, we failed to show
that the income effect is very strong. This may due to a lack of satisfactory
income variables, but no other variables are available in the ELFS dataset.
In the regressions the entire sample of individuals in the working age, i.e.
individuals aged 15 to 74 are included. Individuals in the upper tail of the dis-
tribution may be regarded as pensioners, and they might have different labour
supply behaviour than younger individuals. This, however, turns out not to be
the case. If only individuals aged 15 to 65 are included in regression (3.1), the
results are broadly similar. In particular, the labour participation elasticity is
estimated to 0.554, which is only marginally below the value for the full sam-
ple. We therefore continue employing the full sample inclusive of the elderly,
as this group potentially constitutes an important part of the total labour force.
The estimations in this subsection of the Estonian labour supply using the
full sample of the 2005 ELFS have yielded important results. The participa-
tion elasticity can be estimated precisely and the point estimate is reasonable,
whereas it has not been possible to derive a reliable estimate of either the con-
ditional or unconditional working hours elasticities.
4.4. Labour supply for different income groups
This paper aims to evaluate how personal income taxation affects employ-
ment and welfare across different income groups. Therefore, it is expedient to
divide the full sample into sub-samples based on income and estimate labour
supply elasticities separately for each sub-sample. Kleven and Kreiner (2006a,
2006b) emphasise the importance of heterogeneity in the labour supply deci-
sion across different income groups, but also show that it is possible to attain
more precise MPFC estimates by disaggregating the sample even if the labour
participation and hours elasticities are identical across all income groups.
Weconsiderfourgroupsorsub-samplesbasedonthenotionalhourlylabour
income of the individuals in the group. The 14,567 individuals have been di-
vided into four groups based on their notional hourly income. The low income
group comprises individuals that earn or are expected to earn an hourly in-
come in the lowest quartile of the distribution. The middle-low income group
28is made up of individuals with a notional income in the second lowest quartile.
The middle-high income group consists of individuals with notional incomes
in the second highest quartile, while the high income group comprises persons
with notional incomes in the highest quartile.
We have estimated the selection model in (3.1) using Heckman’s two-
stage procedure for each of the four sub-samples. Table 4 shows the results.
In a number of cases, dummy variables have been omitted to avoid perfect
collinearity.
The results in Table 4 reveal that there are substantial differences in labour
response across the four income groups. As in the case of the full-sample
estimations, the hourly after-tax wage affects the decision regarding participa-
tion positively and the participation elasticities of all four groups are estimated
with relatively small standard errors.
Individuals in the middle income groups exhibit higher labour participation
elasticities than individuals in the low and high income groups. The partici-
pation elasticity is around 0.35 in the low income group, 0.65 in the middle
income groups, and slightly above 0.3 in the high income group.
KlevenandKreiner(2006b:23)summarisetheempiricalliteratureonlabour
supply elasticities in the following way: “[F]rom available evidence, it seems
reasonable to conclude that participation elasticities are large, perhaps above
0.5, for the groups in the lower part of the income distribution. Participation
elasticities in the middle part of the distribution are likely to be substantially
lower, while there is almost no responsiveness of labor force participation at
the top of the distribution.” The results obtained in this study for Estonia are
thus within the range of estimates reported in the empirical literature, although
the elasticity at the lower end of the income distribution might be relatively
small in Estonia.
It was discussed in Section 2 that individuals interviewed for the ELFS
likely underreport their income. If a possible underreporting is proportional
within each income group, the estimated elasticities will not be affected; the
logarithmic transformation of the pay variable means that such proportional
underreporting will only affect the constant terms in the selection and hours
regressions. However, the elasticities will be biased if the underreporting is
not proportional.
It follows from Table 4 that the intensive margin elasticities are insignif-
icant (at the 5 percent level or better) for all the income groups. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that changes in after-tax hourly income do not affect
the number of hours worked by individuals already working in any noticeable
way. This result is reasonable in light of the dataset exhibiting an extreme con-
centration of observations with 0 and 40 hours worked per week, respectively,
29Table 4: Estimation of monthly logarithmic working hours with selection, four
sub-samples
  (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4) 
  Low  Middle-low  Middle-high  High 
  Selection  Selection  Selection  Selection 
  Marg. eff.  S.E.  Marg. eff.  S.E.  Marg. eff.  S.E.  Marg. eff.  S.E. 
LHPAYHAT  0.353
***  (0.065)  0.643
***  (0.172)  0.637
***  (0.164)  0.319
***  (0.073) 
AGE  -0.084  (0.058)  -0.330
***  (0.086)  -0.334
***  (0.083)  -0.269
***  (0.068) 
AGE2  -4.052
***  (0.328)  -7.957
***  (0.512)  -7.409
***  (0.494)  -4.901
***  (0.435) 
FEMALE  0.048
**  (0.020)  0.116
***  (0.027)  0.092
***  (0.024)  0.009  (0.023) 
ISCED2  -0.013  (0.026)  0.268
***  (0.081)  0.666
***  (0.084)  -0.307
**  (0.142) 
ISCED3  -0.006  (0.030)  0.250
***  (0.082)  0.998
***  (0.004)  -0.145  (0.091) 
ISCED4  0.063  (0.046)  0.280
***  (0.082)  0.464
***  (0.042)  -0.297
**  (0.135) 
ISCED5  -0.051  (0.041)  0.275
***  (0.089)  0.861
***  (0.086)  -0.116
*  (0.067) 
ISCED6  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
MARRIED  0.010  (0.014)  0.069
***  (0.022)  0.088
***  (0.022)  0.092
***  (0.018) 
ADULTS  -0.002  (0.006)  0.028
***  (0.009)  0.026
***  (0.008)  0.002  (0.007) 
DEPENDENTS  -0.022
***  (0.008)  -0.062
***  (0.011)  -0.044
***  (0.010)  -0.025
***  (0.008) 
STUDYSEC  -0.201
***  (0.015)  -0.380
***  (0.028)  -0.418
***  (0.047)  -0.356
***  (0.074) 
STUDYTER  -0.103
***  (0.022)  -0.287
***  (0.030)  -0.351
***  (0.041)  -0.196
***  (0.036) 
Total obs.  3,641  3,638  3,647  3,641 
  LHOURS  LHOURS  LHOURS  LHOURS 
  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
LHPAYHAT  -0.102  (0.348)  -0.244  (0.168)  -0.793*  (0.431)  -0.253  (0.171) 
AGE  -0.252*  (0.134)  -0.088  (0.099)  0.065  (0.249)  0.150  (0.180) 
AGE2  0.486  (3.460)  0.232  (1.860)  6.453  (4.034)  1.928  (2.417) 
FEMALE  -0.098  (0.067)  -0.136
***  (0.030)  -0.185
***  (0.064)  -0.072
*  (0.044) 
ISCED2  0.035  (0.058)  -0.198
*  (0.109)  0.082  (0.099)  ..  .. 
ISCED3  -0.011  (0.065)  -0.119  (0.107)  0.013  (0.072)  -0.090  (0.103) 
ISCED4  -0.057  (0.080)  -0.124  (0.111)  ..  ..  -0.016  (0.112) 
ISCED5  0.277
**  (0.139)  -0.189  (0.115)  0.041  (0.083)  -0.117  (0.112) 
ISCED6  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  -0.227  (0.185) 
MARRIED  -0.014  (0.028)  -0.036
*  (0.020)  0.084  (0.058)  -0.108
**  (0.047) 
ADULTS  0.004  (0.013)  -0.007  (0.008)  -0.026  (0.019)  0.003  (0.012) 
DEPENDENTS  0.012  (0.025)  -0.003  (0.015)  0.037  (0.028)  0.023  (0.018) 
STUDYSEC  -0.035  (0.303)  -0.175  (0.135)  0.544
*  (0.293)  0.295  (0.217) 
STUDYTER  -0.505  (0.170)  -0.092  (0.087)  0.375
*  (0.193)  0.084  (0.096) 
PRIMARY  -0.010  (0.032)  0.123
***  (0.021)  0.109
**  (0.051)  0.068  (0.047) 
SECONDARY  0.031  (0.025)  0.049
***  (0.013)  0.037  (0.034)  0.026  (0.024) 
WORKMORE  -0.444
***  (0.044)  -0.429
***  (0.029)  -0.298
***  (0.065)  -0.327
***  (0.062) 
CONSTANT  5.734
***  (1.142)  6.257
***  (0.640)  8.122
***  (1.484)  6.376
***  (0.679) 
Mill’s lambda  -0.308  (0.261)  -0.211  (0.146)  -0.939
***  (0.352)  -0.692
***  (0.267) 
Uncensored obs.  836  1,732  2,485  2,930 
  Notes: The marginal effects and their standard errors are shown in the selection regression. For the dummy variables,
the marginal effect is the discrete change of the variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors (S.E.) are shown in brackets
beside the coefﬁcient estimates. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate that the null hypothesis of the coefﬁcient
being equal to 0 is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of conﬁdence, respectively.
30cf. Figure 1. Similar results have also been attained in recent empirical work
for other countries (Evers, 2005; Kleven and Kreiner, 2006a).
We conclude from Subsections 5.3 and 5.4 that the main effect on the
labour supply of variability in hourly after-tax income is via the extensive mar-
gin. Individuals with lower expected after-tax pay have a lower probability of
participation even when controlling for a large number of other factors. It is
difﬁcult to obtain reasonable and reasonably precise estimates of the effect of
hourly labour income on the number of hours worked by individuals already
working. Likewise, attempts to estimate the income effect emerged as fruitless
as no statically signiﬁcant relationships could be established. In light of these
inconclusive results, it seems reasonable to assume that both uncompensated
and compensated working time elasticities will be close to zero.
5. Employmentandwelfareconsequencesofchanges
in personal income taxation
In this section we seek to estimate the effects of changes in the personal
income tax on employment and welfare. The estimates are comparative static
results based on the labour supply responses estimated in Section 4 along with
information on employment, working hours and labour income for each of the
four subsamples.
Table 5 provides summary information on each of the four income groups.
The four groups comprise the quartiles based on hourly notional income. It is
noticeable that the number of working individuals and, hence, the labour mar-
ket participation ratio increase markedly across the four income quartiles. The
number of monthly working hours increases slightly across the four income
groups.
Table 5: Summary statistics for the four income groups
  (5.1)  (5.2)  (5.3)  (5.4) 
  Low  Middle-low  Middle-high  High 
Number of individuals   3,641  3,638  3,647  3,641 
Number of working individuals   836  1,732  2,485  2,930 
Average HPAY of active individuals   17.05  20.88  25.15  33.39 
Average HOURS of working individuals  163.4  170.9  173.3  175.2 
Monthly income net of tax of working individuals   2,785  3,568  4,358  5,848 
Estimated labour participation elasticity  0.353  0.643  0.637  0.319 
Relative weight of group  0.874  0.905  0.968  1.253 
  Source: ELFS, 2005; author’s calculations.
A main conclusion from Subsections 4.3–4.4 was that economic incen-
tives have a statistically and economically signiﬁcant effect on the labour mar-
ket participation of individuals in Estonia, while the effect on the number of
31working hours of individuals already working cannot be determined with any
degree of certainty. The participation elasticity of each of the four income
groups is reported in Table 5. While it seems reasonable to assume that both
the compensated and uncompensated working time elasticities for participat-
ing individuals are close, they can be ignored, i.e. set equal to zero.
We consider only changes to the personal income tax system. One conse-
quence of the ﬁnding that economic incentives mainly affect the labour supply
through the decisions regarding participation is that an incremental change in
tax policy only affects the labour supply insofar as it affects the average tax
rate (Kleven and Kreiner, 2006a). There is no income effect in this case as
the non-participating individual has no income — or, alternatively, has only
income sources that are not affected by the tax policy change.
It is important to make explicit the economic and behavioural assumptions
underlying the experiments. First, we apply the “symmetry principle” when
analysing the effect of changes in the income tax. Thus, it is assumed that
individuals will react similarly to changes in after-tax income whether these
are the result of tax policy changes or of other factors. In other words, the
labour participation elasticities estimated in Section 5 and reproduced in Table
5 are assumed to capture the impact on the decisions regarding participation
of changes in tax policy.
Second, it is assumed that changes in the system of personal income tax-
ation exclusively affect those providing the employment. In other words, the
hourly pay before personal income taxation is constant and unaffected by, for
example, tax policy changes. This incidence assumption is consistent with
a ﬂat pre-tax labour demand schedule, which may be a realistic assumption
depending on the technology used.
Third, the tax policy simulations seek to incorporate the effect of the “ﬁrst
round” of adjustments undertaken by individuals when tax changes affect their
post-tax labour income. Consequently, the time horizon is such that the labour
supply responses estimated in Section 4 have time to take place. These results,
which are based on the ﬁrst round of adjustments, should not be mistaken for
“morning after” simulations that seek to assess the revenue effect and distri-
butional consequences immediately after changes in tax policy have been im-
posed. The results from the ﬁrst round simulations should also not be mistaken
for general equilibrium effects such as changes in the pre-tax wage, employ-
ment and income patterns.19 The choice of simulation for the ﬁrst round of
adjustments also suggests that the results are more reliable for relatively small
changes in tax policy than for large-scale reforms that may affect wage and
19Notice that the incidence assumption discussed above is consistent with the simulation
of the effects of the ﬁrst round of adjustments.
32employment opportunities in more fundamental ways.
The choice of a partial adjustment model is based on the wish to retain a
simple speciﬁcation and to obtain results that are not the outcome of complex
general equilibrium modelling. Browning (1987) ﬁnds that the speciﬁcation of
the main behavioural relationships is of greater importance for the results than
the inclusion of general equilibrium effects. Browning (1987:22) concludes
that “arriving at a more precise estimate of marginal welfare cost may well
depend more on empirical investigation that narrows the range of possible
parameter values than on developing more rigorous models ...”.20
Fourth, the reliability of the simulations is constricted by the lack of in-
formation on the behaviour and income sources of individuals who are not
working. For instance, the ELFS (2005) database does not contain informa-
tion on whether or not a non-working individual receives taxable income in
the form of unemployment beneﬁts, scholarships or a disability pension. Fur-
thermore, we do not know whether or not a non-working individual receives
income from informal sector activities.
Fifth, the lack of information also implies that some details of the Estonian
tax system as described in Section 2 cannot be implemented in the simulations.
For instance, the pensioners’ additional exemption cannot be incorporated.21
We have similarly been forced to ignore exemptions for children, interest ex-
penses and educational outlays.
5.1. Effects on labour supply
This sub-section considers the employment effects of two different tax pol-
icy experiments. The results are shown in Table 6 for each of the four income
groups and for the full sample. The full-sample results are obtained by weight-
ing the results for each of the income groups using the weights in Table 5.
The ﬁrst experiment assumes that the basic exemption is reduced by 10 per-
cent from 1700 EEK per month to 1530 EEK. The effect on the average post-
tax hourly income in percentage terms depends on the initial average labour
income in the group. The low and middle income groups experience substan-
tial decreases in employment, whereas the effect is smaller in the high income
group. The high income group is, in percentage terms, less affected than the
20However, Goulder and Williams (2003) argue that the calculation of excess burdens
based only on estimates of elasticities for one market can lead to biased results as interac-
tion effects will be important in many cases.
21As explained in Section 2, the additional allowance for pensioners amounts to slightly
more than the average pension, so the omission of pensions and the additional allowance from
the simulations is likely to have relatively little impact for the average pensioner.
33Table 6: The effects of two tax experiments on employment and tax revenue
  (6.1)  (6.2)  (6.3)  (6.4)  (6.5) 
  Low  Middle- 
low 
Middle-
high  High  Full 
sample
a) 
Basic exemption lowered 10%           
Change in group post-tax hourly income, %  -1.46  -1.14  -0.94  -0.70  .. 
Change in group employment  -16  -24  -21  -10  -69 
Change in employment, % of group population  -0.52  -0.74  -0.60  -0.22  -0.48 
Change in tax revenue from group, 1000 EEK  6.4    15.0    42.7    111.4    200.7 
           
Tax rate increased by 1 percentage point           
Change in group post-tax hourly income, %  -0.51  -0.68  -0.80  -0.90    .. 
Change in group employment  -6  -15  -18  -14  -53 
Change in employment, % of group population  -0.18  -0.44  -0.51  -0.30  -0.36 
Change in tax revenue from group, 1000 EEK  2.2    9.0    36.6    149.0    232.2 
  a) Full sample results are calculated using weights of each sub-sample.
Notes: The starting point is a basic exemption equal to 1700 EEK and a tax rate equal to 24%. Summary statistics for
the four income groups are provided in Table 5.
other groups from the lowering of the basic exemption and in addition has a
relatively low labour participation elasticity. Total employment decreases by
0.48 percentage points.
The second experiment is an increase of the tax rate by 1 percentage point.
Average post-tax hourly labour income decreases the most in the high income
group. Still, the largest increases in employment are found in the middle in-
come groups because of the higher labour participation elasticities in these
groups. Total employment decreases by 0.36 percentage point.
The simulation experiments suggest that there are sizeable employment
effects of tax changes and that the total employment effects of the two exper-
iments are of broadly comparable magnitudes. However, it is noticeable that
the two experiments have very different effects across the four income groups;
the lowering of the basic exemption reduces employment mainly in the low
and middle income groups, while the increase of the personal income tax rate
reduces employment disproportionately among individuals in the middle in-
come groups.
The choice of tax instrument also affects the distribution proﬁle in other
ways. In Table 6 the extra tax revenue from each group is shown for the two
experiments. The extra tax revenue is calculated as the net change in revenue
intake from the personal income tax, the social tax and the unemployment
contribution. The two tax experiments produce broadly the same increase in
net tax revenue, but a larger share of the burden falls on the lower income
groups when the basic exemption is reduced than when the income tax rate is
increased.
The simulated employment effects of personal income tax changes shown
in Table 6 depend closely on the labour participation elasticities estimated in
34Subsection 4.4. Given that the participation elasticities for Estonia are broadly
in line with results found elsewhere, it is not surprising that the employment
effects of income tax changes are comparable to results obtained in other re-
cent studies.22 The effects in Estonia might, however, be in the upper tail of
the distribution of employment effects found in other studies (i.e. be relatively
large).
Section 2 brought up the possible underreporting of labour income in the
ELFS.Asarguedabove, proportionalunderreportingwithineachincomegroup
would have little or no effect on the estimated participation elasticities. How-
ever, proportional underreporting may still affect the simulation results as in-
come above and below the basic exemption of 1700 EEK per month are taxed
verydifferently. Theloweringofthebasicexemptionby10percent(170EEK)
may thus lead to a larger percentage reduction in hourly after-tax income and
a larger fall in employment than if underreporting did not take place. Con-
versely, an increase in the tax rate by 1 percentage point may lead to a smaller
percentage reduction in hourly after-tax income and a smaller fall in employ-
ment than if underreporting did not take place.
5.2. The marginal cost of public funds
The excess burden or deadweight loss of (distortionary) taxation is the ex-
tra cost incurred by society because of behavioural changes resulting from
distorted price signals. The excess burden of personal income taxation stems
mainly from the tax affecting the return on taxable employment, when the
returns on the alternative use of time remain unchanged by the tax.
A measure of the total excess burden of personal income taxation is often
difﬁcult to obtain. At the same time, such a measure captures the average
cost to society of raising tax revenue, while in many circumstances it is more
useful to know the marginal cost of raising tax revenue. The marginal cost
of public funds (MCPF) denotes the cost to the private sector when changes
in tax policy increase the tax revenue marginally. In the present context, it is
useful to think of the MCPF as the private cost of the government raising an
additional 1 EEK in tax revenue. The MCPF can then be thought of as the
sum of the tax revenue (1 EEK) and the change in the excess burden per 1
EEK of tax revenue. The MCPF can only be less than 1 if the excess burden
is negative, i.e. if the revenue is raised in a way that reduces distortions in the
economy.23
22Kuismanen (2000), Tondani (2006), Rutkowski and Walewski (2007), Bicakova (2006)
and Võrk et al. (2007) are examples of recent studies using a number of different empirical
methodologies.
23In models where both taxes and beneﬁts are included, the MCPF will typically be below
35The calculation of the MCPF is relatively straightforward when the uncom-
pensated and compensated elasticity of supplied hours is close to 0 as implied
by the estimation results in Section 4. In this case, personal income taxation
only affects social welfare via the extensive margin and there is no need to
take into account income effects, as personal income taxation does not affect
individuals who are not participating in the labour market.
The calculation of the MCPF is illustrated in Figure 3. The number of in-
dividuals participating is shown as an increasing function of the hourly labour
income, net of tax (in EEK). The initial average tax rate is t0, implying that the
initial tax revenue is the area A + B. When the average tax rate is increased to
t1 > t0, the number of active individuals is reduced and the tax revenue is the
area A + C. The excess burden stems from the retrenchment of employment
because of the lower after-tax pay. Thus, the excess burden is the area B plus
the small Harberger triangle immediately below B. However, the Harberger
triangle is of a second order of magnitude and can therefore be ignored for
small changes in the average tax rate. Thus, the marginal cost of public funds
can be calculated as MCPF = 1 + B/(C – B). This formula is used in the calcu-
lations below with group speciﬁc averages for the monthly pay, participation
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Figure 3: The marginal cost of public funds from a tax increase
Source: Figure adopted from Kleven and Kreiner (2005).
1 if additional government revenue comes from a reduction of beneﬁts that distort labour
supply.
36As stated above, the MCPF is 1 plus the amount of initial tax revenue
displaced per 1 EEK generated. This raises the question of which taxes should
be included in the initial tax revenue.24 It was brought up in Section 2 that
the Estonian pension system implies that pension contributions create future
liabilities for the government (or the private pension fund) and therefore may
not be considered a tax in its standard deﬁnition as a compulsory contribution
for which the taxpayer receives no speciﬁc beneﬁts or services. Thus, the
pension contribution may — partially or fully — be regarded as a savings and
not as a tax.
Likewise, to the extent that working individuals spend their post-tax in-
come on goods and services that are subject to the value added tax or other
forms of taxation in Estonia, the tax revenue from such taxes is also eroded if
higher income taxes lead to lower employment and creation of income. The
exact tax component of the social tax earmarked for pension contributions is
virtually impossible to pin down and the spending patterns of individuals are
not available in the ELFS. Therefore, we calculate the MCPF under three dif-
ferent assumptions based on which taxes are assumed to be displaced when
additional tax revenue is raised through higher personal income taxation.
Table 7 shows the results for each of the four income groups and for the full
(weighted) sample. A natural baseline is to assume that tax revenue includes
revenue from the personal income tax, social tax and unemployment insurance
contribution. It follows from the upper panel that the MCPF in this case is
around 4.7 for the low income group, 4.3 for the middle-low income group,
2.3 for the middle-high income group and 1.3 for the high income group. The
estimated MCPF for each of the four income groups is identical whether the
extra revenue from the group is generated by lowering the basic exemption
or by increasing the tax rate. This is the consequence of a change in only
the average tax rate affecting the labour supply response along the extensive
margin.
The marginal cost of income tax revenue differs markedly across the four
income groups. The high MCPF for the low income earners is straightforward
to explain: a given tax increase provides only modest additional revenue as
the average income in the low income group is comparatively small, while
the displaced employment leads to a substantial reduction in total tax revenue
(since the social tax is paid on the entire wage bill without any exemptions).
The consequence is that in order to generate an extra 1 EEK in revenue, the
income tax pressure has to be raised substantially which consequently leads to
a substantial drop in employment and hence a loss of initial tax revenue. At
24Noticethatpossiblederivedeffectsontaxpaymentsbyemployersareignoredsochanges
in employment are not expected to affect, for example, enterprise proﬁts in any discernable
way.
37Table 7: The marginal cost of public funds, two different tax policies
  (7.1)  (7.2)  (7.3)  (7.4)  (7.5) 
  Low  Middle- 
low 
Middle-
high  High  Full 
sample
a) 
Baseline           
Basic exemption lowered  4.65  4.28  2.30  1.34  1.83 
Tax rate increased  4.65  4.28  2.30  1.34  1.62 
           
Excluding pension contributions           
Basic exemption lowered  1.56  1.58  1.38  1.15  1.28 
Tax rate increased  1.56  1.58  1.38  1.15  1.23 
           
Including value added tax           
Basic exemption lowered  18.24  108.11  3.74  1.49  2.45 
Tax rate increased  18.24  108.11  3.74  1.49  1.99 
  a) Full sample results are calculated using weights of each sub-sample.
Notes: The starting point is a basic exemption equal to 1700 EEK and a tax rate equal to 24%. Summary statistics for
the four income groups are provided in Table 5.
the other extreme, the MCPF is relatively moderate for the high income group.
This is a consequence of the high rate of participation in this group, the high
income and the low labour participation elasticity.
The full-sample results in (7.5) are derived under the assumption that the
tax policy instrument in question is applied to all groups in order to raise 1
EEK in extra tax revenue. This also explains why the MCPF for the full sam-
ple is higher when the basic exemption is lowered than when the tax rate is
increased. The increase in the tax rate brings in much revenue from the high
income group and, consequently, the rate does not need to be raised much to
bring in the additional revenue. However, the decrease of the basic exemp-
tion brings in less revenue from the high income group and must therefore be
relatively large.
As argued above, the pension contribution component of the social tax may
onlypartially—ornotatall—beconsideredataxastheindividualpayingthe
contribution builds up future claims on the Estonian government and in many
cases also a private pension insurance provider. The centre panel of Table 7
shows the results when 20 percentage points of the 33 percent social tax are
left out of the tax measure used to calculate the MCPF.25 It is striking how the
MCPF is reduced as a consequence of this reclassiﬁcation, particularly for the
low and middle income groups. The explanation is evidently that the social
tax payments of these groups comprise a larger share of total taxes than is
the case for the high income group. The results underscore the importance of
the classiﬁcation of government revenue after the pension reforms in the late
1990s.
25The 20 percent is the payment to the ﬁrst pillar government-administered pension fund
paid by individuals who do not participate in the second pillar scheme, cf. also Section 2.
38The lower panel of Table 7 shows the results when the baseline setup is
amended with the assumption that all labour income net of income taxation is
spent on goods and services for which an 18 percent value added tax is paid.
The expansion of the tax measure used in the MCPF calculations increases the
MCPF dramatically for the low and middle-low income group and markedly
for the middle-high income group.26 The result for the low income group
suggests that with the expanded tax measure, the average individual in the low
income group is not far from the maximum point of the Laffer curve.
We will now return to the baseline case which estimates the MCPF to be
equal to 1.6 when additional tax revenue is raised via a higher proportional tax
rate.27 When assessing the size of the MCPF estimate, it is important to keep
in mind that this is the marginal cost of public funds, not the average cost. The
MCPF from the changes in personal income is typically much larger than the
average cost of public funds as the MCPF, ceteris paribus, increases with the
tax rate.
The aggregate MCPF estimate for Estonia is large compared to MCPF es-
timates in studies from the 1970–80s. These studies, however, did not dis-
tinguish between the intensive and the extensive labour supply margins. An
often cited study is Browning (1976), which estimates the MCPF for the USA
to be in the range of 1.09–1.16 depending on the progressivity of the tax in-
crease analysed.28 Stuart (1984) ﬁnds a somewhat larger MCPF estimate for
the USA, namely 1.21–1.24 in the baseline scenario.29 Kleven and Kreiner
(2006b) provide MCPF estimates for the OECD countries explicitly incorpo-
rating both the intensive and extensive margins in their simulations. Their
MCPF estimates for a proportional tax increase range from close to 1 to up to
4 depending on the assumptions concerning, for example, the labour supply
elasticities. The MCPF estimates are indeed very large for speciﬁc income
groups in some countries, and in some cases the tax rate is above the Laffer
curve maximum.
The main difference between the welfare results in this study and the re-
sults in Kleven and Kreiner (2006b) is the distribution of the MCPF estimates
across income groups. The results for Estonia presented in Table 7 show that
26With this deﬁnition of the labour tax revenue, the initial tax rate on the middle-low
income group appears to be close the Laffer curve maximum.
27Incidentally, if pension contributions are excluded and value added taxation is included
at the same time, then the MCPF estimates are close to the baseline results.
28An updated and “corrected” version of the paper was published as Browning (1987)
and the possible range of the MCPF for the USA was then estimated to be from 1.1 to 4.0
depending on the parameter speciﬁcation employed.
29See Ruggeri (1999) for an overview of MCPF results from earlier studies that employ
partial and general equilibrium methodologies, but generally do not distinguish between the
intensive and extensive margins.
39the MCPF generally decreases with the average income in the group, while
Kleven and Kreiner (2006b) ﬁnd that the MCPF increases with the average
income in the group, particularly so for countries with highly progressive in-
come tax systems. The reason for this difference is likely to be the ﬂat income
taxrateinEstonia, whichmeansthathighincomeearnersinEstoniafacemuch
lower tax rates than high income earners in most OECD countries. Thus, a tax
rate increase on high income earners in Estonia displaces much less initial tax
revenue than a similar increase in an OECD country with progressive taxation.
This insight also helps explain why the overall MCPF estimations for Es-
tonia are in the lower range of the estimates provided by Kleven and Kreiner
(2006b). The ﬂat tax in Estonia means that the cost to society of raising tax
revenue from the higher income groups is relatively small and since most of
therevenueisderivedfromthisgroup, theoverallMCPFisrelativelymoderate
in Estonia.
The employment and welfare results presented in Tables 6 and 7 are subject
to numerous limitations and sources of uncertainty and should be interpreted
in light of these concerns. First, the lack of general equilibrium effects im-
plies that the results should be seen as playing themselves out in the short or
medium term. Second, the labour participation elasticities are estimated with
uncertainty. Third, underreporting may lead the employment response to be
upward or downward biased depending on the experiment undertaken; possi-
ble biases will be carried into the welfare calculations. Fourth, no information
on non-labour income is available, which may affect both the estimation of
the employment elasticities, the calculation of the employment response and
the simulations of the welfare effects. Fifth, numerous speciﬁcities concern-
ing the tax system have not been taken into account. Finally, possibly the most
worrying source of uncertainty is the uncertainty concerning which taxes to in-
clude in the calculation of the MCPF. This concern can only be addressed by
including much more detailed information on the behaviour of non-working
individuals and such information is not available in the case of Estonia.
6. Final comments
The paper has sought to provide estimates of the employment and welfare
effects of changing the personal income taxes in Estonia. The empirical analy-
sis entailed two steps; namely, an econometric analysis providing estimates of
the labour supply responses of different income groups and simulations to as-
sesstheimpactofdifferenttaxexperimentsonemploymentandsocialwelfare.
The econometric analysis is based on the 2005 Estonian Labour Force
Survey comprising approximately 16,500 individuals of working age, among
40which 8,000 are active in the labour market. The results suggest that the hourly
after-tax wage primarily affects the participation decision, while it has negli-
gible effect on the number of working hours of individuals already working.
Individuals in the middle income groups exhibit higher labour participation
elasticities than individuals in the low and high income groups.
The participation elasticities — together with data on participation rates,
incomes and tax rates for each of the four income groups — can be used to es-
timate the employment effect of different tax policies. For instance, lowering
the basic exemption by 10 percent reduces total employment of working-age
individuals by slightly less than 0.5 percent. Increasing the proportional tax
rate by 1 percentage point reduces overall employment by 0.35 percent. Dif-
fering participation elasticities and mean incomes across the income groups
imply that the effect differs across the groups. The low and middle income
groups experience the largest employment reduction when the basic exemp-
tion is increased.
The excess burden of an incremental increase in tax revenue stems from re-
duced labour participation with a derived effect on tax revenue. The baseline
simulations suggest that if the proportional tax rate is increased, the marginal
cost of public funds is around 1.6, i.e. the extra cost of raising revenue is
approximately 60 percent in excess of the tax revenue generated. If the ba-
sic exemption is lowered, the marginal cost of public funds is estimated to
be around 1.8. The estimates of the marginal cost of public funds vary no-
ticeably, dependent on the assumptions concerning pension contributions and
value added taxes.
The marginal cost of raising public funds through personal labour income
taxation differs markedly across different income groups. For instance, in
the baseline scenario the marginal cost of public funds is estimated to be 4.7
for the low income group, 4.3 for the middle-low income group, 2.3 for the
middle-high income group, and 1.3 for the high income group. These results
may point to possible efﬁciency gains from redistributing the tax burden as
compared to the existing proportional tax system. On the margin, a reduction
of the tax burden of lower income individuals will bring about a substantial
labour participation response and increase welfare. On the margin, an increase
of the tax burden of higher income individuals may only lead to a modest
reduction in employment and welfare for individuals in this group. Assuming
a utilitarian social welfare function, a revenue-neutral tax reform reducing the
income tax burden on lower income individuals and increasing it on higher
income individuals may lead to higher societal welfare. Evidently, this result
is based on a narrow assessment of the welfare consequences and overlooks,
for example, administration costs, compliance issues and political economy
issues.
41The analysis in this paper represents a ﬁrst attempt to assess the employ-
ment and welfare effects of personal income taxation in the Estonia context.
As with most studies on the effects of taxation, the results are subject to a sub-
stantial margin of error. Future studies should seek to reﬁne the analysis and
incorporate a number of potentially important issues left out of this study.
The analyses in this paper could be augmented if heterogeneity in the form
of gender, aga, employment status etc. were taken into account in the estima-
tion and simulation exercises. It would also be desirable if the labour supply
elasticities could be estimated with more precision, but this would require a
dataset of high quality (likely based on register data) and with detailed data
on working time, labour income and other income sources. It would also
be advantageous to determine the employment and distortionary effects in a
micro-simulation model where the effects of tax policy changes on individual
behavioural could be traced.
It may also be useful to model the general equilibrium effects of tax poli-
cies on the economy in order to get estimates of the longer-term employment
and welfare effects. Such general equilibrium models can include different
forms of imperfections in the economy in addition to possible labour supply
effects from government spending on, for example, education, health and in-
frastructure. The models can also incorporate the intertemporal effect of tax
policies including the possible effects on economic growth. Evidently, such
models are complex and leave much discretion to the modeller.
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46Appendix A. Labour supply without selection
As an interim step, we estimate labour supply functions without explicit
consideration of the selection issue in order to gain an understanding of the
labour supply process. Table 8 shows the results when the number of monthly
working hours (HOURS) is explained by the predicted hourly pay (LHPAY-
HAT), along with a range of other covariates. We consider two different spec-
iﬁcations, including and excluding non-working individuals, respectively.
Table 8: Estimations of monthly working hours without selection
  (A.1)  (A.2) 
  HOURS  HOURS for HOURS > 0 
  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
LHPAYHAT  61.56
***  (4.64)  -4.69  (2.90) 
AGE  -55.53
***  (5.78)  -27.17
***  (3.63) 
AGE2  -1,107.77
***  (32.24)  -376.37
***  (24.11) 
FEMALE  2.52  (1.80)  -12.43
***  (1.12) 
ISCED2  -11.80
***  (2.92)  7.75
*  (4.34) 
ISCED3  -5.00  (3.42)  7.77
*  (4.37) 
ISCED4  -1.60  (7.95)  7.76
*  (4.54) 
ISCED5  -4.83  (4.50)  6.44  (4.71) 
ISCED6  -4.14  (11.27)  14.58
**  (7.29) 
MARRIED  10.22
***  (1.44)  -0.86  (0.90) 
ADULTS  2.02
***  (0.56)  0.28  (0.35) 
DEPENDENTS  -4.28
***  (0.69)  -0.32  (0.44) 
STUDYSEC  -56.77
***  (2.88)  -29.69
***  (3.47) 
STUDYTER  -54.37
***  (3.03)  -17.43
***  (2.05) 
CONSTANT  -59.60***  (14.29)  193.32***  (9.72) 
No. of obs.  14,568    7,983   
R
2  0.402    0.095   
  Notes: Standard errors (S.E.) are shown in brackets beside the coefﬁcient estimates. The superscripts ***, ** and
* indicate that the null hypothesis of the coefﬁcient being equal to 0 is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of
conﬁdence, respectively.
Column (A.1) shows the results when all observations in the sample are
included, i.e. working individuals (HOURS > 0) as well as inactive individuals
(HOURS = 0). The estimated coefﬁcient of the predicted hourly log income
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The point estimate indicates that a 1
percent increase in the hourly income increases the number of hours worked
by 0.6. The average working time for all individuals is 94.5 hours per month,
implying a labour supply elasticity of around 0.7 when taken for working and
non-working individuals in total.
However, estimation (A.1) blends the extensive and intensive choice of
the individual, possibly leading to an unspeciﬁed regression and unreliable
coefﬁcient estimates (Heckman, 1993). Therefore, it is necessary to employ
estimation methods that explicitly model the combined selection and working
hours choice. This is undertaken in Subsection 5.2 of the main text.
47Column (A.2) considers only the intensive choice, i.e. the number of work-
ing hours of individuals already employed. The results are markedly different
from those obtained when the whole sample is used. In particular, the esti-
mated coefﬁcient of the predicted log hourly income is now insigniﬁcant (and
with a negative sign). Many of the coefﬁcients of the control variables also
change substantially.
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